Friday, April 27, 2012

IMF Supports Marietta Global Growth Forecast

In an encouraging update to its January World Economic Outlook, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated last week that “global prospects are strengthening again…” and boosted its 2012 global GDP growth estimate from 3.3 to 3.5%.  In its upbeat assessment, this prestigious and influential organization rejected worrisome gloomy predictions of another “soft patch” in the U.S., of sovereign debt crises and austerity budgets in Europe triggering a descent into a serious recession, and of economic hard landings in China and other leading emerging economies.  The expected gradual reacceleration in growth is attributed to “improved financial conditions, accommodative monetary policies, a similar pace of fiscal tightening as in 2011, and special factors (reconstruction in Japan and Thailand).” 

Further, the IMF raised its forecast for 2013 global growth to 4.1%, and projected accelerated growth increase in the U.S. (from 2.1 to +2.4%), the Euro Area (from -0.3 to +0.9%), and the major emerging countries (from 5.7 to +6.0%).  We note that this positive forecast agrees with Marietta’s Outlooks since mid-2009 that the global economy had entered a multiyear global expansion of about 4% per year led by the emerging economies with the U.S., Europe, and Japan trailing with supportive albeit subpar GDP growth (see, e.g., our April 5, 2010 Outlook).

The IMF economists are hardly pollyannaish, and emphasize that “…the global economy remains unusually vulnerable.”  At the top of their list of risks is renewed escalation of the euro area crisis followed by concern that geopolitical developments in the Mid-East will trigger another spike in oil and gasoline prices.  They acknowledge that their forecasts assume that “spillovers from the euro area are likely to have limited effects on economic activity [elsewhere] for as long as the euro area crisis is contained” and that the price of oil will average “about $110” per barrel.  We at Marietta are also well aware of these and other risks, but we continue to believe that future investment prospects remain.

Although the financial media is preoccupied with downside risks, the IMF also discusses the upside risks.

There are also upside risks: growth might turn out stronger than projected if there is more rapid recovery in the United States and the euro area, thanks to a stronger policy response to the euro area crisis and improved confidence, and if the geopolitical tensions recede and the risk premium in oil prices dissipates. Greater confidence and waning supply-side disruptions could also foster a more forceful rebound in global durables consumption and investment, helped by generally healthy corporate balance sheets and less costly capital.

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

Good reading: Too Big To Fail: How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System—and Themselves


Good reading: Too Big To Fail:  How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System—and Themselves by Andrew Sorkin (Viking, 2009) 544 pp.


Four years have passed since the collapse of Bear Stearns, which ushered in twelve months of economic recession and financial market upheaval. To historians of the economic history of the United States and its financial markets, the importance of this period is rivaled only by the Crash of ’29 and the Great Depression. The causes and consequences of the 2008-09 crisis will be debated and continue to be controversial for decades to come, but the definitive narrative will likely remain Sorkin’s Too Big To Fail. In 544 pages of gripping day-by-day description of the major participants and developments, Sorkin admirably captures the pulse of Wall Street and Washington during these unforgettable months. The passage of four years provides a fresh perspective for a re-read of this to-be classic, and the book should be required reading for young professionals entering the investment industry.

The most dramatic and historic events of this chaotic year occurred in September of 2008.  In less than 30 days, the financial landscape was forever altered. Mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken over by the government. Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America in an eleventh-hour rescue. American International Group, the largest insurance company in the U.S., was put on government life support. Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, in a desperate effort to avoid a similar fate, rushed to become bank holding companies thereby gaining unlimited access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window. The failure of Reserve Primary Fund triggered a panic run on money-market funds that threatened to disrupt the entire financial industry. The Dow Jones Industrials commenced a plunge with unprecedented volatility that by March of 2009 measured 50%.

Sorkin’s narrative centers on the indefatigable and at times frantic efforts of Treasury Secretary Paulson, Fed Chairman Bernanke, and New York Fed head Geithner to steer the financial system through this perfect storm. As they were painfully aware, their actions constituted the biggest intrusion of the U.S. government into free-market capitalism in the country’s history. For this they were and continue to be condemned by many politicians and market commentators. Their defense is that their actions were necessary to prevent financial and economic Armageddon. Bernanke stated in a critical meeting with skeptical congressional leaders:  “I spent my career as an academic studying great depression. I can tell you from history that if we don’t act in a big way, you can expect another great depression, and this time it is going to be far, far worse.” In an oval office meeting with President Bush, Paulson said:  “If we don’t act boldly, Mr. President, we could be in a depression deeper than the Great Depression.”  Sorkin sides with Bernanke and Paulson:  “To be sure, if the government had stood aside and done nothing as a parade of financial giants filed for bankruptcy, the result would have been a market cataclysm far worse than the one that actually took place.”  

If Paulson, Bernanke, and Geithner were driven by a determination to save the U.S. economy, the heads of the major Wall Street firms and U.S. Banks were motivated by less lofty considerations.  These titans of American finance worshipped at the altar of personal status, money, and power.  On occasion they expressed concern for their shareholders and employees, but there is no mention of a desire to protect the public good. An example occurred in October, when the CEO’s of the 9 major firms were summoned by Paulson, Bernanke, and Geithner to a make-or-break meeting to approve an injection of taxpayer money into the financial system as a desperate step to restore stability. With tens of millions of American jobs at stake, the initial reaction of Merrill-Lynch CEO John Thain was to complain that such a step might result in changes in Wall Street executive compensation policies.

In an insightful epilogue penned in 2009, Sorkin offered the sober conclusion that the big Wall Street firms and banks remained too big to fail. He asserted further that ego, greed, and a “vulture capitalism” that abuses clients, which were a major ingredient in fomenting the turmoil, were still salient characteristics of Wall Street. Nevertheless, much has changed since the years and months leading up to 2008, and the likelihood of a similar financial upheaval is now remote. The overheated housing market and abuses in the mortgage industry, which precipitated the crisis, now seem to be a unique phenomenon of the past. The banks and investment firms are much better capitalized, much more sensitive to risk, and far more heavily regulated. The government has also learned from the experience, and is far more vigilant and better equipped to identify and respond to excesses before they imperil the entire financial structure. In retrospect, the cataclysm of 2008-09 created widespread economic suffering for millions of Americans, but it also provided a beneficial wake-up call. Sorkin’s book will be a reminder to generations to come of how perilous the situation was and thereby serve as a deterrent to a future crisis.     

Tuesday, February 28, 2012

Kathy Klein Presents Positive Case for Global Equities

On January 31, Marietta portfolio manager Kathy Klein presented an optimistic outlook for global stock markets to about 90 retirement professionals attending a luncheon sponsored by the Greater Milwaukee Employee Benefits Council.

Kathy opened with a brief review of the challenging market conditions of 2011, when a relentless flow of negative news events convinced many investors that Europe and the U.S. were headed for a double-dip recession. Most of the world’s stock markets declined: the All Country World Index excluding the U.S. slumped 13.7% and the leading emerging-economy markets crumbled more than 18%. The U.S. faired better, not so much because the U.S. economy was attractive, but rather because it was viewed as a safe haven in troubled times. Within the S&P 500 Index, the defensive industry sectors of utilities, consumer staples, and health care were the major winners, and the biggest losers were the economy-sensitive, cyclical industrials, materials, and financials.

Kathy then pointed out that conditions in early 2012 have improved dramatically. The U.S. economy is accelerating, the European policy-makers seem determined to deal effectively with their sovereign-debt crisis, and declining inflation in the emerging economies is permitting their central banks to adopt pro-growth initiatives. Market trends have correspondingly reversed. Global stock markets, led by the emerging-economies, have surged. Within the S&P 500, last year’s leading industry sectors are now the worst performers and vice versa.

The obvious question posed by this reversal is: can the positive market trends of January extend through 2012? Here, Kathy emphasized the importance of the current synchronized global accommodative policies of central banks. It was just such a synchronized global stimulus that was the most important catalyst in lifting the global economy out of the recession of 2008-09 and triggering a new bull market.

Kathy also noted that in many leading global markets the fundamentals and technicals are positive. Time did not permit her to explore these conditions in all of these markets, so she limited her discussion to the U.S. market. In particular, she identified nine indicators which historically have been associated with bull markets. These included GDP growth, strong corporate balance sheets, compelling valuations, subdued inflation, low interest rates, an accommodating Fed, and large cash reserves.

A very interesting and relevant observation made by Kathy was that sluggish GDP growth of 2-3% in the U.S. should not necessarily lead investors to conclude that prospects for U.S. stocks are at best modest. To the contrary, since 1960 periods of weak-to-moderate growth have provided the best S&P 500 gains.

Key to Kathy’s positive case for the U.S. market is continuing profit growth coupled with a very attractive valuation. A high-single digit profit gain in 2012 by S&P 500 stocks in combination with P/E multiple expansion to a non-recession level could produce a solid, double-digit advance for this benchmark index. P/E valuations for the international markets are even lower, and the prospect of a very considerable market advance in the emerging markets is pronounced.

Kathy pointed out that negative news events could again upset the positive case, but concluded with Marietta’s 2012 upbeat investment recommendations:

1.       Be open to the positive case for equities
2.       Take a longer-term view (avoid excessive responses to headline news)
3.       Adopt a global perspective (take advantage of international opportunities)
4.       Watch for risk-on, risk-off decoupling
5.       Beware of macro investing (watch the policy makers)
6.       Track closely the fundamental progress of your securities